I. INTRODUCTION
THIS article focuses on a particular aspect of the operation of proprietary estoppel: it asks when a proprietary estoppel claim will give rise to a property right. The inquiry proceeds on the linked assumptions that proprietary estoppel is a means of acquiring rights and that rights thereby arising take effect immediately, without the need for any court order.
1 Like any other means of acquiring rights, proprietary estoppel can give rise either to personal rights or to property rights: in some cases the estoppel claimant is acknowledged to have a personal right (e.g. to damages 2 or a licence to use land 3 ); in others a property right (e.g. a lien;
4 an easement;
5 a lease; 6 or a freehold 7
). The central argument of this article is that proprietary estoppel should give rise to a property right only if that is necessary to protect the claimant's reasonable reliance. Where a personal right gives sufficient protection that will have to do, whatever the claimant may have been promised or expected; this may well mean that the circumstances in which a property right arises are more narrow than has been thought. The premise on which this argument rests is that, consistently with the law's clear desire to contain the situations in which property rights arise, 8 a claim should give rise to a property right only if that is demanded by the principle underlying that claim. It is therefore vital to explain the principle that underpins the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and to provide further principles which will enable parties and courts to judge when an estoppel claimant has acquired a property right and when a merely personal right. 9 Some may think that a search for such principles will be both futile and inappropriate. Futile as the broad discretion that characterises proprietary estoppel cannot be adequately described by specific principles; inappropriate because the flexibility of the doctrine should not be circumscribed. Neither claim is accepted. There are sound reasons why the operation of proprietary estoppel should be governed by a closely structured discretion. The basic imperative of treating like cases alike requires that the specific factors which guide a court's decision be identified. It simply will not do to say that because the underlying purpose of estoppel is to ''prevent unconscionability'' the judge in each case has an openended discretion. Further, as in any area of law, the greater certainty conferred by elaborating specific principles lessens the risk of extensive and costly litigation. Certainty is at a premium in this particular context as third parties dealing with the land will need to know if the estoppel claimant has acquired a property right in that land. Moreover, as section 116(a) of the Land Registration Act 2002 confirms that rights arising through estoppel can take effect before an order of the court, it is no longer possible to argue that rights arising through estoppel should be determined on a discretionary basis and only have effect after a court order declaring their existence. 10 It is therefore crucial that the principles underlying the acquisition of rights through proprietary estoppel be brought to the fore.
It will therefore be argued that proprietary estoppel is endowed with no more discretion than any other equitable source of rights. Although much academic thinking and judicial dicta suggest otherwise, emphasizing the discretionary nature of estoppel, the principles discussed below are drawn from, and hence consistent with, the vast majority of case-law. Similarly, the claim that a property right should exist only if necessary to protect the claimant's reasonable reliance, whilst novel, is consistent with not only the law's general desire to contain the incidence of property rights but also the outcomes in much of the case-law on proprietary estoppel.
11
In what follows A is the owner of land; B is the person who reasonably relies upon an expectation, for which A is responsible, that he has or will acquire some right in relation to A's land; and C is the transferee of A's land. In essence it is argued that:
1. Proprietary estoppel is an event which gives rise to rights without the need for an order of the court; it does not simply enable B to be a ''supplicant seeking the exercise of a discretion in his favour''. 12 2. Proprietary estoppel always gives B a personal right against A, and this right will continue even if A transfers the land to which B's expectation relates to C. 3. The extent of B's right will be guided by the need to protect B's reasonable reliance on the expectation for which A is responsible and will be governed by the principle of proportionality. This principle demands that B's right is the minimum response necessary to protect B's reasonable reliance. The court's determination of that right is constrained by principle and is not simply a matter of intuitive justice. 4. Proprietary estoppel may also give B a property right, enforceable in the usual way, but only when this is necessary to protect B's reliance. 5. If B's right is threatened, then B may go to court to seek a remedy. The court will then decide on an appropriate remedy to protect B's right; the exercise of the court's discretion at this stage may involve a wider range of factors than are relevant in determining B's right. As when making any order, the court will take into account circumstances prevailing at the time of the order. This is no different from the discretion exercised whenever a court has to decide how to protect B's equitable right, however it has arisen.
In order to substantiate these arguments, the first task is to identify the principle which motivates the recognition of proprietary estoppel claims (Part 2) and then to describe the protection afforded to B if he is left with a merely personal right (Part 3). This sets the scene for examining the central question of when proprietary estoppel should additionally lead to a property right (Part 4). The picture will then be completed by analysing the remedy B may receive to give effect to a right arising through proprietary estoppel (Part 5).
II. THE BASIS OF PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
In order to determine the nature and extent of rights arising through proprietary estoppel it is crucial to ask why proprietary estoppel is recognised as a source of rights. Any account of the underlying purpose of the doctrine must be consistent both with the test for the availability of a proprietary estoppel claim, and with the extent of the rights awarded in response to such a claim. In particular cases proprietary estoppel may have the effect of allowing the informal grant of a property right; of enforcing a promise; or of reversing an unjust enrichment. Yet none of these three aims can constitute the basic purpose of the doctrine as, by itself, each fails to account both for the test for the availability of a claim and for the extent of the rights thereby gained by B.
14 On this approach, the only satisfactory theory of proprietary estoppel is one which explains proprietary estoppel as generating rights in order to protect B's reliance. Analysis of the case law shows that proprietary estoppel is concerned with reacting to and protecting B's reasonable reliance, where A can be said to be responsible for the expectation on which that reliance was based. This particular form of reliance seems to be the unifying feature which justifies the courts' view of proprietary estoppel as a single doctrine. 15 Moreover, this aim of protecting B's reliance explains the diverse range of responses to a proprietary estoppel claim. It does not follow that protecting reliance will limit B to recovering the direct financial cost of his reliance. This is no surprise: the reliance B needs to show in order to bring a claim is not limited to 14 Moriarty's view that estoppel is a mechanism for the ''informal creation of proprietary rights in land'' cannot explain cases where B has a non-proprietary expectation, nor those where B is awarded a personal right after reliance on a proprietary promise (S. 17 B's reliance in that case consisted of selling part of his land without reserving a right of access to his remaining land. Were A then able to deny B his expected easement over A's land, B would be left without access to that remaining land. That particular reliance could only be protected by allowing B to have the expected easement over A's land. In some cases, protecting B's reliance will require B's receiving a property right through an informal grant; in others it will require the enforcement of a promise by A; in others the reversal of A's unjust enrichment; in others the reimbursement of money spent by B. In each case, however, each response will not be a goal in itself but will rather be a means to the end of protecting B's reliance.
The suggestion that the basic function of proprietary estoppel is to protect B's reliance is not novel. Drawing largely on Australian case-law, Robertson and Spence have both developed similar, but differing, accounts of a general estoppel doctrine (extending beyond proprietary estoppel) which is centred around the need for A to take responsibility for the protection of B's reliance. 18 This certainly does not mean that there is any consensus as to the purpose of proprietary estoppel as applied in the Australian courts, 19 but it may be significant given the English courts' recent use of proportionality in assessing the appropriate response to a proprietary estoppel claim. In Sledmore v. Dalby, Hobhouse L.J. drew extensively on the judgment of Mason C.J. in Commonwealth of Australia v. Verwayen, 20 noting in particular the statement that: ''A central element of [estoppel] is that there must be a proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which is its purpose to avoid. It would be wholly inequitable and unjust to insist upon a disproportionate making good of the relevant assumption. '' 21 The use of proportionality in recent English decisions supports the view that the purpose of proprietary estoppel is to protect B's reliance: making a proportionate award, like finding the ''minimum equity to do justice to [B]'', 22 entails recognizing that B has a right which adequately protects his reliance, but goes no further. The application of this principle in practice can be seen by a consideration of Jennings v. Rice 23 and Ottey v. Grundy. 24 In Jennings v. Rice, B spent a considerable amount of time looking after A but was paid nothing. When challenged about her failure to pay him, A said something to the effect that ''this will all be yours one day''. B's expectation was-at the minimum-of the house and furniture worth £435,000, and-at the maximum-of the entire estate worth £1.285 million. The actual award was £200,000, based on the cost of equivalent full-time nursing care for A. The facts of Ottey v. Grundy were somewhat unusual as A and B had reached an explicit agreement about what property B should receive in the event of A's death: the plan was for B to receive a life interest in a houseboat, valued at £240,000 to £250,000, plus an apartment. However, when A died three years later, the necessary formalities had not been completed. Judge Langan Q.C. noted that the expectation was wholly out of proportion to the detriment B had incurred in reliance on the agreement and awarded the much lesser sum of £50,000 plus the apartment. Hence, even if A has made a very clear promise, enforcing B's expectation will not always be the appropriate or proportionate response to the estoppel.
It is possible to take the results in Jennings and Ottey as evidence of the wide discretion a court has when responding to an estoppel claim. 25 Certainly, there is a tendency to equate the move away from the automatic enforcement of expectations with a move towards the courts having discretion to react to a proprietary estoppel as they see fit and even to re-distribute property rights. 26 However, as discussed above, it is preferable to find specific principles which can be used to regulate that task: even when departing from expectations a court must, as Robert Walker L.J. emphasised in Jennings v. Rice, ''take a principled approach''. 27 Admittedly, protecting B's reliance is a less predictable standard than routinely enforcing B's expectation: there will always be an element of judgment in gauging what is proportionate. The matter will not, however, be left to the unbridled discretion of the court: the crucial point is that the response to the estoppel will be guided by the goal of protecting B's reliance. 23 28 In such cases, B is at risk if A transfers the relevant land to C: the personal right B has acquired through the estoppel cannot bind C. There is no reason, however, why B should not still be able to assert his personal right against A: A's liability to B should not end simply because of the transfer to C. 29 Imagine, for example, that in Jennings v. Rice A had transferred the property to C during her lifetime but after B had relied on A's assurances that it would be his. There is no reason to think this variation would prevent B's asserting his personal right against A and thereby gaining £200,000: the need to protect B's reliance would remain.
It can therefore be argued that proprietary estoppel, like wrongs, unjust enrichment and other non-consensual sources of rights, always gives rise to an underlying personal liability which may, in some circumstances, be coupled with a property right. As A's personal liability will persist after a transfer of the land in respect of which the proprietary estoppel claim arose, it may well be that B has no need of a property right to protect his reliance: instead B is adequately protected through his personal right against A. In Beale v. Harvey, 30 for example, A divided some disused farm buildings into building plots and exchanged contracts to sell plot 1 to B whilst retaining plot 2. Before completion, but with A's consent, B began to landscape her garden and improve the fencing. Unknown to both parties at that stage there had been a mistake made by A in marking out the boundary: the boundary fence included as part of plot 1 land that was in fact part of plot 2. The sale to B was completed and the mistake emerged only later, after C had contracted to buy plot 2 from A. Once the mistake had come to light, A offered to move the boundary fence to the correct position and to compensate B for any disturbance this caused. B refused to agree to this and instead claimed that A was estopped from moving the boundary fence and that this estoppel bound C by virtue of the Land Registration Act 1925, section 70(1)(g). Hence proprietary estoppel should only give rise to a property right if a personal right is inadequate to protect B's reliance. The first part of this section is therefore an examination of the principles which determine how B's reliance is to be protected. The second part then determines if the application of these principles necessitates B's acquiring a property right. This is done by identifying the advantages that flow from having a property right as opposed to a purely personal right and asking if B needs those advantages in order for his reliance to be fully protected.
A. Protecting B's Reliance: Basic Principles 1. All cases: B's right cannot exceed his expectation It will never be a proportionate response for B to get more than he was expecting. 35 reliance. Dodsworth v. Dodsworth 36 provides a good illustration: B1 and B2 spent a sum of money improving A's bungalow in the expectation that they would be able to live there, with A, for as long as they wished. The Court of Appeal could not see a way of protecting the occupation of B1 and B2 without creating a life interest under the Settled Land Act. However, as it would lead to B1 and B2's acquiring a ''greater and more extensive interest than was ever contemplated'', 37 this solution was not adopted. Given that expectations set a cap on B's right, it is clear that B should not acquire a property right through estoppel if he expected some lesser right. Careful attention must therefore be given to the question of whether B's expectation falls within the group of recognised property rights in land. This is particularly relevant in cases where B expects ''a roof over his head''. In land law the choices for an occupational right are clear: if it is a property right it must be either a freehold estate (sole or, if shared, behind a trust of land) or a lease; otherwise it must be a licence, a personal right enforceable only against A.
Of course, A and B are unlikely to have thought in such terms: it is for the law to put a form on the substance of their expectations. The first question is whether B expected ownership, be it indefinitely (freehold) or for a limited period (leasehold); 38 be it sole 39 or shared. 40 In many cases, B's expectation involves sharing occupation with A, and hence the right B expects is unlikely to involve exclusive possession of any part of A's land. If it is also clear that a share of the freehold is beyond B's expectation then, as in Dodsworth v. Dodsworth, 41 B's expectation will, at most, amount to an indefinite licence. 42 In such a case, it will be impossible for the proprietary estoppel claim to give rise to a property right.
Hence, as B's expectation forms a cap to his estoppel claim, B's ability to fit that expectation within the class of property rights is a 36 (1973) 
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Proprietary Estoppelnecessary condition of B's acquiring a property right through the estoppel. However, it must be emphasised that it is by no means a sufficient condition-B will still need to demonstrate that his reliance can only be adequately protected by means of a property right.
''Bargain Cases'': B's expectation is protected if B performs an agreed quid pro quo
In cases where A promises a defined right in return for particular, clearly defined action by B (bargain cases) then, if B fully performs his side of the bargain, the court will protect B's expectation. Until then, A is free to withdraw the assurance and B will have a right that protects his reliance to date, taking account of the original assurance. Once reliance is complete, however, the proportionate response will almost always 43 be to enforce the bargain (but not necessarily in specie).
44 Proportionality is assured because A and B have ascribed particular value to B's reliance and B has done exactly what A agreed or suggested was necessary in order to acquire the promised right. 45 As Robert Walker L.J. noted in Jennings v. Rice, enforcing the expectation will be neither an excessive response to B's reliance, nor a disproportionate burden upon A: ''the consensual element of what has happened suggests that the claimant and the benefactor probably regarded the expected benefit and the accepted detriment as being (in a general, imprecise way) equivalent, or at any rate not obviously disproportionate. '' 46 Case law provides many illustrations of this ''bargain'' principle. 47 In Voyce v. Voyce B was promised a cottage by his mother, A, ''provided he did it up to his mother's satisfaction''; after completion of the work the court recognised that B was the equitable owner. 48 Singh v. Sandhu is described by Balcombe L.J. as a ''quid pro quo'' case: B was encouraged to put up a garage on A's land in return for an exchange of land, and was recognised as the fee simple owner of the land on which the garage was built.
49 43 Subject to proportionality performing a minor role where the extent of the requested reliance is not clearly set in advance and there is, as it turns out, a great disparity between expectation and reliance: see the discussion of promises to provide life-long care, text below from n. 52. 44 As to whether an in specie remedy will be available, see Parts 4B and 5, below. 45 Indeed, reimbursing the costs incurred by B in performing his side of the bargain will be an inadequate response as it will fail to take account of the parties' perception of ''the balance of risks and rewards'' to B of performing his side of the bargain: see Etherton J. Likewise in Baker v. Baker B paid £33,950 to help A1 and A2 buy a house in return for a right, living as part of the family, to occupy the granny room rent-free for the rest of his life and it was this right that set the value of B's award. 50 There are, of course, some similarities between these cases and the operation of contract law. B's reliance seems to mimic the role of consideration in ensuring the enforceability of B's expectation. These bargain cases are not, however, simply instances of contract law at work. First, in these cases, the agreement is usually not enforceable as a contract because of the absence of necessary formalities.
51 Secondly, whereas a contractual promise is binding from the moment of agreement, in these estoppel cases A is free to withdraw his assurance unless and until B has completed his side of the bargain. If B has begun to rely on the assurance, then he will have an estoppel claim against A but this will only entitle him to a right necessary to protect his reliance to date and will not guarantee enforcement of B's expectation. 52 Thirdly, it may be that proportionality does have a minor role to play if B's expectation greatly exceeds his reliance. This might occur in cases where the reliance consists of performance for an indefinite time and, as events turn out, the end date occurs sooner than the parties envisaged (or wanted). In Jennings itself is not a bargain case as the assurance was uncertain, but if there were a clear bargain of a house in return for life-long care and A were to die very shortly after this promise it is unlikely that the court would consider enforcement of such a bargain appropriate. In cases where the value of the reliance is fixed (such as the renovation of the cottage in Voyce v. Voyce) 54 it will not be for the court to second guess whether the bargain itself is proportionate, but where the value of the reliance cannot be known at the outset because it depends on unpredictable future events it is 50 [1993] 2 F.L.R. 247. In the event, although B's expectation set the extent of his right, he was unable to enjoy the right in specie. This is discussed further below, text at n. 114. 51 If the agreement involves the creation of a property right, then it will only be contractually enforceable if it complies with the requirements of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s. 2. 52 The estoppel situation thus differs from that of a unilateral contract. Where there is a unilateral contract, if A withdraws a promise as B is attempting to perform the condition necessary to enforce that promise, A will be in breach of contract. In the preceding section, cases ''like a contract'' were discussed where the usual defect preventing contractual enforcement is the absence of the requisite formalities. There is also a category of cases, again similar to contract, where the defect is that the contractual agreement has not been finalised, let alone formalised: a right is being negotiated between A and B, the parties have reached an agreement in principle, 56 and some further conduct by A leads B reasonably to believe that A will honour that agreement, notwithstanding the fact that it is not, in itself, legally binding.
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Where A and B have agreed all material terms governing the grant of the right including the consideration that B will provide in return, an act by B that shows that he is relying upon A's assurance that their agreement will be honoured is likely to lead to enforcement of his expectation. 58 This prevents A's relying on the ''usual commercial position'' that there is no binding agreement.
In these cases, B's reliance is closely interwoven with A's assurance. In Lloyd v. Dugdale 59 A and B were negotiating a lease. B urgently needed to relocate his business and agreed to take a long lease of A's property, which needed restoring. B was concerned that it would be unwise to spend money on A's property until things were tied up. Reassured by A's comments that he was a ''man of his word'' and ''not to worry'', B spent substantial sums on the property, effectively becoming ''locked in '' 60 to this particular property and losing the opportunity to buy premises elsewhere. Against this background the Court of Appeal recognised that A would be under an obligation to grant B the agreed lease. In JT Developments v. Notwithstanding this failure, A's agent and B had a conversation that, on balance, the majority of the Court Appeal agreed was ''fairly capable of being held by the judge to have been, a promise that, unless and until told otherwise, B could rely upon getting a lease . . .'' 62 B had previously told A's agent that he intended to do some work on the property, and after that crucial conversation he spent £2,100 on kitchen improvements and a new air scrubber. Given their reading of the conversation between the agent and B, the Court of Appeal held that A should have recognised that it was not free to resile from the agreement without first telling B. In these circumstances A was bound by proprietary estoppel to grant a new lease to B.
63
In cases where the negotiations have been expressly conducted ''subject to contract'' there will need to be very strong indicators indeed that A intends B to rely upon the agreement; given that both parties must be taken to know that either is free to withdraw it will not usually be unconscionable for A to deny the agreement. 64 Although there have been successful estoppel claims in ''subject to contract'' cases, 65 these will be rare.
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These ''agreed interest'' cases differ from the bargain cases, even though the outcome will usually be the same, namely enforcement of B's expectation. In bargain cases the assurance is for a right in return for the reliance. The reliance provides the ''consideration'' for the right (value being judged by A and B). In agreed interest cases the assurance is that there is a binding agreement and B's reliance prevents A from going back on this assurance. B's reliance provides the reason why A is prevented from denying the agreement; the consideration for the right itself is provided by the terms of that agreement (for example, the rent agreed for a lease). B's reliance is worthy of protection because A has led B to believe 62 ibid. at 51. 63 
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that it is safe to act on the basis that they have a binding agreement. Proportionality will usually lead to enforcement of expectations because the reliance in most cases means that B has ''burnt his bridges'' in terms of other possible projects. Further, protecting B's expectation is unlikely to be disproportionate as A will still receive the agreed consideration for the right. At first glance, however, it sometimes looks as if the courts are too ready to assume that any act of reliance by B will enable him to enforce his expectation. JT Developments provides a good example-given B's relatively small reliance expenditure, could it really be said that B was ''locked into'' the project with A, and that the minimum necessary to protect B's reliance was the grant of the agreed lease? Might not a more proportionate response have been to require A to reimburse B for his wasted expenditure? These cases may, however, require a broader look at the impact of B's reliance. A's attempt to renege on the planned bargain will often be motivated by a desire to take advantage of a market which is now more favourable to him. By leading B to believe in the binding nature of the planned agreement, A will have caused B to forego the opportunity to seek a similar deal elsewhere in the previous market conditions. 67 Therefore, no matter how small B's out of pocket expenditure, it may well be necessary to secure B's expectation if his reliance (in failing to take advantage of the then prevailing market conditions) is to be adequately protected.
4.
Cases not involving a bargain or agreed interest: B's expectation will be protected only if that is a proportionate means of protecting B's reliance As in the bargain and agreed interest cases, the extent of the right B acquires will be governed by proportionality, taking into account the nature and quality of A's assurances and the nature and extent of B's reliance. Proportionality has a more prominent role in these cases as the parties have not planned that B should receive his expected right as part of an actual or eventual agreement. Further, B's expectation will rarely be the product of a specific assurance by A: the assurance may be vague (e.g. ''You will be able to live here''; ''You will get everything I have when I die''); or there may be no assurance at all. Therefore, in contrast to the two previous categories, there is no default rule in favour of protecting B's expectation.
Equally, it must be emphasised that B will not necessarily be limited to claiming re-imbursement of out of pocket expenses incurred in reliance on A. Whilst this will be the appropriate response in some cases, such as Dodsworth v. Dodsworth 68 or Beale v. Harvey, 69 it is important to recognise that B's reliance can extend beyond simple expenditure.
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In Habermann v. Koehler, for example, A promised B1 and B2 that they could live rent free in A's house for the remainder of A's life and that they would also have the chance to purchase the house outright. In reliance on this clear assurance, B1 and B2 moved into A's house, giving up the council house they rented and hence losing the chance to purchase it at a discount. B1 and B2 had lived in A's house as their home for over a year when A mortgaged it to C, who later tried to remove B1 and B2. It was eventually decided that B1 and B2 had acquired a lease for A's life at a peppercorn rent.
71 Whilst this case does not fit into either of the two previous categories, the clarity of A's assurance, coupled with the nature and extent of B's reliance, justified the protection of B's expectation. 72 In Crabb v. Arun D.C., B's reliance consisted of losing an opportunity to reserve an easement when selling off part of his land and the only effective way to protect such reliance was to protect B's expectation of an easement over A's land. 73 There is a larger element of judgment involved in determining B's right here than in the two previous categories and the courts are therefore more likely to be viewed as acting with a wide discretion. Indeed, when B receives a monetary award, as in Campbell v. Griffin, the amount of damages can seem to be plucked from the air: in that case, damages of £35,000 was selected but no explanation was given as to the basis for this sum. 74 Similarly, in Murphy v. Burrows, the judge considered that B had lost £12,000 in wages but would have taken £25,000 as the basis of an estoppel award. 75 Orange 80 the misconduct involved the presentation of fraudulent documents at the court hearing. The effect of B's not coming to a court of equity with ''clean hands'' is that B is denied a remedy. 81 Indeed, it is difficult to see why misconduct should be used as a factor in judging the appropriate response to an estoppel; there is no reason why the extent of B's right should be affected by a particular court's view of the quality of his conduct. 76 As to oppressive conduct by A, it is similarly difficult to see why a general and unfocussed inquiry into A's behaviour should be relevant: indeed, the existing case-law does not provide strong support for such a contention. 82 The ''need for a clean break'', stemming from a recognition that parties cannot be compelled to live together, needs to be treated carefully. This factor may be relevant to two points made elsewhere. First, it may be that an expectation of B to share property with A is consistent only with a personal right; hence this factor may be relevant to determining the extent of B's right as it demonstrates the limited nature of B's expectation. 83 Secondly, the effect of the estoppel award on A may be in issue. For example, granting B a lease of a specific part of A's land may constitute a disproportionate burden on A. 84 As to ''alterations in [A's] assets and circumstances'', it should be emphasised that the availability of a proprietary estoppel claim does not provide the courts with a justification to distribute property according to the current needs of the parties. This factor should be relevant only where B's expectation is related to A's future assets. A may, for example, promise B that he will get all of A's estate; if A then wins the lottery shortly before dying, it is very unlikely that the proportionate response to B's reliance will be to enforce B's expectation. Yet there is no need to explain this by reference to an independent factor; it rather stems from the basic goal of protecting B's reliance. In the light of that goal, it seems difficult to see the relevance of the likely effect of taxation or the presence of other claims on A or A's estate.
Therefore, as far as assessing the extent of B's right is concerned, the list of factors suggested by Robert Walker L.J. seems overly broad. It must be emphasised that a court does not have licence to conduct a general inquiry into the relative merits of the parties' conduct; in an estoppel claim, it is B's reliance on A that puts the parties before the court and the court's role must therefore be limited to recognising rights based on that reliance. Nonetheless, it is readily admitted that this group of cases will involve an element of judgment in assessing the proportionate response to the estoppel. The courts should focus squarely on the goal of protecting B's reliance, taking into account the quality of any assurances by A and the nature and extent of B's reliance: only then will they be able to give reasoned explanations providing useful guidance for future cases. 82 See Gardner, ibid. at 455-457. 83 See above, text from n. 40. 84 See below, text at n. 114.
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Basic Principles
In order for an estoppel claim to generate a property right it must be the case that a personal right against A is inadequate to protect B's reliance. It will not be sufficient to show that B needs in specie protection, as this can be achieved by a personal right against A: for example, licences can be protected by the award of an injunction. 85 Rather, the essential feature of a property right that marks it out from a personal right is exigibility: its capacity to bind third parties. Therefore, what needs to be shown is that B's reliance is not adequately protected if he has a right enforceable against A only. This principle is not often articulated in the case-law, although it is consistent with most actual decisions. In Pascoe v. Turner, for example, Cumming Bruce L.J. identified particular features of the case that led to B's having the fee simple: it was clear that, as a minimum, the court felt that B needed a right which could be asserted against potential transferees of the property.
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The simple fact of land being the subject matter of the claim is not sufficient to support a property right being given. Moreover, neither is the fact that B has demonstrated that his expectation of a property right should be protected. 87 The starting point is that B's expectation can be protected by a personal right to damages against A, where those damages reflect the value of the property right B expected. B should acquire a property right only in cases where this personal right will not adequately protect his reliance. 85 Hence, even in the first two categories of cases discussed above (the bargain and agreed interest cases), a property right should not necessarily be granted. As for the bargain cases, this can be seen from an examination of Yaxley v. Gotts.
88 B was promised the ground floor of A's property in return for carrying out the building work required to convert the house into flats and then acting as A's managing agent. The work was completed and B had been acting as managing agent for more than two years when the dispute arose. During this time B had been collecting rents from the flats, paying the rent to A, and receiving rent attributed to the ground floor flats. The judge's decision at first instance, confirmed by the Court of Appeal, was that A should execute a 99 year lease in B's favour unless, within four months, he paid B a sum equivalent to the value of such a lease. The form of this order shows that the court decided that B would be adequately compensated by a personal right. If so, there should not have been a property right given in the alternative. As B's interest in the property was an investment opportunity, B had no special attachment to the land as land, and hence there was no need for B to acquire an enduring in rem right.
As for the agreed interest cases, the Canadian case of L&A Management Ltd. v. Gentra Inc.
89 provides an excellent example of why a property right might not be a proportionate response to the estoppel. Unusually, this case includes an explicit consideration of whether a personal right to damages would suffice to protect B. This was due to the nature of the application: B, claiming alternatively in contract and proprietary estoppel, wished to obtain an injunction preventing A's granting a development lease of the property to C. To succeed, B therefore had to show that a right to damages against A would provide insufficient protection. Of course, it should be noted that succeeding in the application for an injunction would not have proved that B had a property right: B's action was against A and hence any injunction could be seen as the in specie enforcement of a personal right. Conversely, where the denial of an injunction rests on the fact that a damages claim against A is adequate protection of B's reliance, then that denial must be inconsistent with B's having a property right. In L&A, the judge assumed that, in the event of B's claim succeeding, whether as a matter of ordinary contract law or under proprietary estoppel, it could be satisfied with an award of damages against A. Damages could be broadly assessed taking account of B's expenditure in pursuit of the project, the loss of profits, and damages for interference with economic relations. 90 B had not established a sufficient attachment to the property as property: as in Yaxley, B's interest in the land was primarily as an investment opportunity. Moreover, the property was not such a unique property that there would be no similar opportunity for B. There was therefore no need to grant an injunction which would hamper the use of the property by preventing A's developing the site with C.
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2. Relevant Factors It should therefore be emphasised that even if the proportionate response to B's reliance is to protect B's expectation, this does not mean that B will automatically acquire the expected property right. Rather, as shown by an examination of Yaxley v. Gotts and L&A, B must show a sufficient attachment to the use of A's land as land such that a merely personal right would fail adequately to protect B's reliance. 92 There are three principal factors which have been used to establish this ''something more'' justifying the recognition of a property right: 
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The Cambridge Law Journal [2005] to his garage. 94 In Ward v. Kirkland 95 B put a bath and lavatory in his own property, running the drainage through A's land to a septic tank with the knowledge of A's landlord (C); on these facts Ungoed-Thomas J refused to grant C an injunction to prevent B's continuing to use the drains. One explanation of this decision is that the judge was protecting, in specie, B's easement of drainage. Alternatively, this may have been the in specie enforcement of a personal right against C himself due to C's acquiescence in B's laying of the drain. Indeed, on the facts it may be that a damages award allowing B to purchase and install his own septic tank would have sufficed to protect B's reliance. 96 An easement is not the only possibility: B may expect ownership of land adjoining his own. In Bibby v. Stirling, 97 B had cultivated, and built a substantial greenhouse on, a strip of his neighbor's land. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge's decision that B had an equitable interest in this strip as long as B lived on the adjoining land, 98 and expressly stated that this should bind A's successors. 99 In Singh v. Sandhu, 100 B built a garage partly on A's land. Balcombe L.J.'s judgment illustrates why it was important for B to have a property right: ''. . . if you are encouraged to put part of your garage on somebody else's land and, indeed by way of a quid pro quo, you give up part of your land by way of exchange . . . the only realistic way of fulfilling that equity is to require [A and A's successor in title] to convey to [B] . . . the necessary fee simple in the part of the garage and in addition, since the garage is not much use if you cannot get to or from it, the appropriate right of way to enable it to do so''. 101 Hence, in both of these cases, B needed a property right capable of binding successors of A to support the use of his own land.
(ii) the need to protect B's current occupation of A's land; The fact that B is occupying the property will often be a strong indication that a property right is necessary. Many well known estoppel cases illustrate this: Dillwyn v. Llewellyn (B built, and lived 94 [1967] 2 Q.B. 379 at 396. There was a difficulty in that case, glossed over by the Court of Appeal, as to whether an easement acquired by estoppel could bind C: see G. Battersby, ''Informal Transactions in Land, Estoppel and Registration'' (1995) 58 M.L.R. 637. 95 [1967] Ch. 194. 96 Such an award would be unnecessary if C agreed to allow B the expected easement. 97 [1998] EWCA Civ. 994. 98 B had never expected a permanent right, only one lasting as long as he lived on the adjoining land. 99 Although it is clear that this was intended to be a proprietary right, the court did not put it in legal form. It is probably best seen as a determinable fee simple. 100 unrep. May 4th 1995, C.A. 101 ibid., per Balcombe L.J.
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Proprietary Estoppelin, a house on A's land and acquired the fee simple); 102 Pascoe v. Turner (B had been living in the house for almost 10 years and acquired the fee simple); 103 Griffiths v. Williams (B had been living in A's house for most of her life and acquired a long lease) 104 and Gillett v. Holt (B had lived in the farmhouse for almost 25 years and acquired the fee simple).
105 This is not only the case in residential situations: occupation of commercial premises may also support a property right. In JT Developments v. Quinn B had been running his business for five years and acquired the right to a new lease on the agreed terms; 106 in Lloyd v. Dugdale B had moved his business into the property and also acquired a lease on the agreed terms.
107
Occupation is relevant even if it does not flow from reliance upon A's assurance. In many cases, B was already in occupation of the property before the relevant expectation of a right in A's property arose. 108 Although it could be argued that B's occupation should only be relevant to determining the right arising through the estoppel if that occupation has occurred in reliance on B's expectation, the case-law shows an appreciation that an assessment of the nature and extent of B's post-expectation reliance cannot artificially exclude B's situation prior to that reliance. Indeed, remaining in occupation of land B already effectively treats as his own is often more significant and demands greater protection than simply going into occupation of a property for the first time. Preexisting occupation means that B has a commitment to this particular property, whether as a home or as a business. Hence a property right is more likely to be necessary adequately to protect B's reliance-disturbance of settled occupation risks causing ontological insecurity for residential occupiers (disturbing their sense of stability and identity) and commercial harm to business occupiers.
Existing occupation will not always necessitate a property right. In Jennings v. Rice, 110 there is no reason why a monetary sum would not suffice to compensate B's reliance (foregone wages), particularly as B had only been sleeping at the property to look after A. When compared with setting up home on A's land, this type of occupation is clearly less effective in establishing B's attachment to the property. Similarly in Beale v. Harvey 111 the court was quite confident that B's reliance in landscaping land she mistakenly believed to be her own would be adequately protected by the receipt of money from A. The Court of Appeal did not agree that the extra strip of land had become hers: ''. . . the detriment suffered by B by acting on A's promise or representation for so short a period is too insubstantial a detriment to make it unconscionable for A to seek to rectify its mistake at its own expense. Putting it another way, to treat what has occurred as giving B the right to a permanent enlargement of her garden at the expense of C with their smaller garden would be, in my view, quite disproportionate.'' 112 The result here can be contrasted with that in Bibby v. Stirling. 113 The difference lies not in the nature of the occupation but rather in the degree of reliance involved-the less substantial reliance in Beale did not suffice to establish a sufficient attachment between B and the property.
Finally, a particular problem which may arise in cases where A and B share occupation of A's land should be noted. Within a sharing arrangement, it may be possible to argue that B should have a right to exclusive possession of a specific part of A's land. However, recognising that B has such a property right will often have a disproportionate impact upon A. A lease of part only of a whole, particularly if it involves the sharing of common parts, will have a significant impact upon the value of A's property and hence may be a disproportionate response to B's reliance. 114 This can be illustrated from the factual background to Baker v. Baker.
115 B had contributed almost £34,000 towards the purchase of a house by A1 and A2. B's claim to a beneficial share failed at first instance and was not pursued on appeal. In the Court of Appeal, Dillon L.J. explained that ''the greatest interest in the property that the parties 110 If, however, this kind of arrangement is viewed as a lease of the granny room it will make it very difficult for A1 and A2 also to enjoy the property. Given the breakdown in their relationship, B's presence would prevent A1 and A2's enjoying their land in specie. B's occupation under a lease would also make it very difficult for A1 and A2 to realise the value of their house on a sale as it will be almost impossible to sell a property which is not designed for multiple units of occupation and yet is partly tenanted. The result is that a lease of part only of a whole will often be a disproportionate response.
(iii) the need to compensate B for giving up an opportunity to acquire a property right. Where B's reliance takes the form of losing the opportunity to acquire an alternative property right, then protecting that reliance may well require that B gain a property right in A's land. Hence, in several cases, courts have taken note of the fact that B's reliance has caused him to forego alternative opportunities to acquire a property right. In both residential and commercial cases, this factor is often coupled with, and can lend weight to, the need to protect B's occupation. 117 In Habermann v. Koehler, B1 and B2's act of reliance included giving up their existing flat which they would soon have been able to buy at a discount under the right to buy legislation; 118 in Gillett v. Holt B had lost his foothold in the property market by selling his own small house in reliance upon A's assurances. 119 Similarly, in Lloyd v. Dugdale, B's reliance expenditure meant that B was ''locked in'' to A's property and had lost the chance to secure business premises elsewhere. 
Proprietary Overkill?
As mentioned in the introduction, courts have not always adopted a conservative approach towards the recognition of property rights-there are cases in which the courts have recognised property rights in B when a personal right would do. It may be that this is in part a hangover from the days when it was simply assumed that 116 ibid. at 250. In this case B had already left the property because of the breakdown in the family relationship and there was no question of his enjoying any occupational right in specie. This must be borne in mind when examining the cases in which B acquires a lien as a result of the estoppel. In recognising B's right to £35,000 in Campbell v. Griffin 127 the Court of Appeal, without explanation, stated that this sum was charged on the property and would take priority over the Council's statutory charge to cover the costs of residential care. The recognition of a lien must be justified in the same manner as other property rights, yet there was no discussion of why a simple monetary award would not suffice. 128 The result in Campbell can be compared with that in Jennings v. Rice: in the latter case, B was acknowledged to have simply an unsecured personal right to payment from the estate. The suspicion must be that it was the subsequent intervention of a third party, in the form of the Council's statutory charge to cover residential care costs, which led to the finding of a lien in Campbell. However, a more principled approach is clearly necessary: liens, if they arise, do so when the facts of estoppel are established; how matters turn out later is not relevant. If a lien is to arise, then a court must explain why it is necessary in order to protect B's reliance.
Liens perform the function of protecting a right to be paid by giving a proprietary right which confers priority and durability. It is not possible to identify a common theme to the situations in which liens can be found and there is no agreement as to their theoretical basis.
129 It may simply have to be conceded that the courts have recognised that certain fact patterns will generate liens: e.g. the right to payment upon the sale of real property (the unpaid vendor's lien); the right to payment for legal services on the recovery of property (the solicitor's lien); and the insurer's lien over money received from a wrongdoer to which the insurer is entitled by subrogation. The question then becomes one of whether particular fact situations within proprietary estoppel are capable of supporting a lien.
Existing case law does not assist on this. Those cases that do involve liens to secure payment do not explain why the lien exists; the closest to an explanation is the observation by Robert Walker L.J. in Jennings that where B's detriment consists of expenditure on improvements an equitable charge may be sufficient to satisfy the efore a constructive trust is imposed, the court should first decide whether, having regard to the issues in the litigation, there is an appropriate equitable remedy which falls short of the imposition of a trust''; yet there was no consideration of why a lien was more appropriate than a simple award of damages. See also the failure to explain why a lien was thought appropriate in Murphy v. 135 A proportionate response to estoppel may well be for B to have a personal right: where that personal right is a right to damages it must not be assumed that it will be secured by a charge on A's land.
Which property right?
It must be emphasised that proportionality in protecting B's reliance will determine not only whether B acquires a property right but also what particular property right B gains: that property right must not exceed the minimum necessary to protect B's reliance. Pascoe v. Turner 136 may provide an example of the dangers of overlooking this point. The court's determination to ensure that B's occupation of her home would be secure may be thought sufficient to justify the acquisition of a property right. Yet was it really necessary for B to acquire the fee simple? Might a lease for life, as in Habermann v. Koehler or Griffiths v. Williams, have been a more proportionate response? 137 In particular, it should not be assumed that, just because B needs a property right, that right must be the property right B expected. In Ottey v. Grundy, 138 for example, B's expectation was of a life interest in A's houseboat as well as full ownership of a flat in Jamaica: B was found to have a property right only in the flat.
Can B's property right change over time?
It is clear that the extent of any right B acquires as a result of proprietary estoppel may vary over time. The usual case will be that B's right grows in order to protect B's continuing reliance: hence, after initially acquiring a personal right, the further reliance may justify B's gaining a property right. 139 The rarer case is where B's right seems to diminish over time. In Sledmore v. Dalby, 140 B's understanding was that he could stay in A's house. By the time of the hearing, B had property elsewhere and was using the house only one or two nights a week, whereas A was vulnerable and likely to lose her present housing. One interpretation of the court's decision to allow A's action for possession is that it was a response to the changing circumstances which led to A's having a more pressing need for occupation than B. 141 On the view put forward in this article, however, a general inquiry into the relative needs of the parties should form no part of the court's role when determining the extent of the right B acquires through proprietary estoppel: rather, only those factors relevant to protecting B's reliance should be considered.
In Sledmore, B had spent money on improving the property over a three year period and had then enjoyed a further fifteen years of rent-free accommodation. Given the limited nature of the detriment incurred by B's initial reliance, a right for B to remain for life would be disproportionate. The best explanation is that B had a right which had already been wholly satisfied: that is a right to occupy for a period shorter than that which elapsed between his reliance and A's action for possession. 142 Therefore, whilst it is correct that A may not have been able to recover possession had the case been brought at an earlier date, this is not because the later change in the parties' needs altered B's right but rather because B's right to stay was always limited in time. As Roch L.J. put it, ''the minimum equity to do justice to [B] on the facts of this case was an equity which has now expired. '' 143 Sledmore v. Dalby can thus be seen as a case in which B acquired a time-limited right which had expired by the time of the court's decision. The crucial question, however, is whether B can acquire a property right which is later lost, not due to any inherent time-limit, but rather due to a change in circumstances. If property rights can be lost, it can only be because of changes that affect one of the factors which meant that a property right was necessary to protect B's reliance in the first place. If, for example, after relying on A's assurance that his home was hers, the mistress in Pascoe v. Turner had won the lottery and purchased a new home, could it be said that she no longer had a sufficient attachment to A's property to justify a property right in it?
The suggestion that property rights might diminish or be lost over time is unappealing. It would give rise to many practical problems, especially in considering the effect of B's right on C. Conceptually, it is difficult to see how B can lose a property right without any overt act on her part, such as a transfer or abandonment. But most importantly, the suggestion that B could lose a property right by a change in circumstances is inconsistent with the purpose of proprietary estoppel. The doctrine aims to protect the reliance B has incurred: therefore, if, by her past acts, B established a sufficient attachment to the property to warrant a property right, that right should not be lost, and A should not benefit, by her later fortune in finding a new home. The need for proportionality demands that the particular property right is justified by the facts as they exist at the time of completion of the acts of reliance. There is no discretion to vary property rights at a later date. Therefore, once B has done enough to establish a property right that right should remain. This provides a further reason why a court should be cautious before deciding that B has acquired a property right. However, as will be seen in Part 5, a change in circumstances can be taken into account by the court when giving effect to B's right.
V. REMEDIES
Having determined the extent of B's right, the court will attempt to fashion an order which gives best effect to that right, given the 
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Proprietary Estoppelprevailing circumstances at the time the order is made. A wide variety of factors come into play at this stage. The crucial point is that, when applied at the remedial stage, these considerations are not unique to proprietary estoppel: rather, they will be relevant no matter how B's right arose. Confusion stems from the fact that, in proprietary estoppel cases, there is often a blurring of the two distinct stages constituted by determining the extent of B's right and then granting a remedy to give effect to it. 144 This leads to an exaggeration of the discretion inherent at the first stage and obscures the fact that the extent of B's right can be determined by the basic goal of protecting B's reliance.
Of the factors identified by Robert Walker L.J. in Jennings v. Rice, 145 a number are relevant at the remedial stage, whether B's right arose through estoppel or some other means. For example, specific performance of a contractual right of B may be denied as a result of alterations in A's needs and circumstances, 146 or due to the position of a third party. 147 Equally, the need for a clean break may be relevant: if B has a contractual licence to share a house with A, yet the two have fallen out, then this may lead to B's being awarded damages rather than an in specie remedy.
148 If B has a beneficial share of the property, for example under a resulting trust, the state of his relations with A, his fellow co-owner, can be taken into account by the court in exercising its powers under section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. Equally, it is possible that the likely effect of taxation may reduce the effectiveness of a particular remedy in giving effect to B's right, and hence lead the court to adopt a different solution. 149 As can be seen, the relevance of these factors at the remedial stage is not unique to proprietary estoppel.
It is clear that the court will have a remedial discretion in deciding whether to give in specie effect to a personal right or to a property right governed by the 1996 Act. 
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The Cambridge Law Journal [2005] would have been unduly wasteful and caused prejudice to third parties. There is, however, little room for such discretion if the court decides that B has acquired a freehold, lease or easement as a result of the estoppel. If such a right is necessary to protect B's reliance, it is hard to see how a court could be justified in forcing B to accept a monetary substitute for that right. This absence of remedial flexibility provides a further reason why courts should be cautious before deciding that a freehold, lease or easement is necessary to protect B's reliance. Where B has a property right but the land has been transferred to C, who is not bound by that right, then in specie enforcement will obviously be barred. In most cases, B will then have to fall back on A's persisting personal liability by bringing a claim for damages. Where B was beneficially entitled to the property, either wholly or in part, then B will have the option of tracing that entitlement into the proceeds of any transfer from A to C.
151

VI. CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this article has been to examine when a proprietary estoppel claim should lead to the acquisition of a property right. To do so, it has been necessary to set out basic principles which can be used to determine the nature and extent of rights acquired by proprietary estoppel. These principles flow from the submission that the goal of proprietary estoppel is to protect reliance on an expectation, for which A is responsible, that B has or will acquire a right in relation to land owned by A.
One important theme has been that the wide discretion which apparently characterises proprietary estoppel has been exaggerated. When determining whether B has a right through estoppel, the court has the general discretion inherent in its equitable jurisdiction and can, for example, deny B's claim due to a lack of ''clean hands''. When assessing the nature and extent of B's right, any flexibility the court possesses is inherent in, and constrained by, the need to do the minimum necessary adequately to protect B's reliance. Finally, when deciding on the appropriate remedy to give effect to B's right, the court can take into account the same wide variety of factors that are relevant whenever a court attempts to fashion a remedy. There is thus no special discretion which is unique to proprietary estoppel claims. Hence there is no need to assume that because the response to proprietary estoppel is not always moored to B's expectation it is therefore free to float on an open sea of discretion.
A further theme has been that the courts must take more care in justifying a finding that B has acquired a property right. It has been contended that B will have a personal right against A which will persist after any transfer of the property by A. Further, this right will not just entitle B to reimbursement of out of pocket expenses but will rather extend to allowing B whatever damages are necessary to protect his reliance: in some cases, these damages should be designed to give effect to B's expectation. Therefore, B should only acquire a property right where the possibility of binding future owners of A's land is necessary to ensure that B's reliance is adequately protected. This stands in contrast to the Law Commission's preferred interpretation of section 116(a) of the Land Registration Act 2002, under which B's estoppel claim is always capable of binding C. Where B's reliance can be adequately protected by means of a purely personal right, it will be unnecessary and disproportionate for B's claim to be capable of binding a transferee of the registered land.
Finally, it should be emphasised that an inquiry into when proprietary estoppel gives rise to property rights should not be viewed in isolation. There is a wider question as to whether, and when, non-consensual sources of rights, such as unjust enrichment or wrongs, should give rise to property rights. The current inquiry has been confined to proprietary estoppel and has attempted to show first, that it is a non-consensual source of rights; secondly, that it clearly is capable of giving rise to property rights; and finally that it is possible to suggest principles regulating when such rights should arise. It may be that the approach suggested here can also be of use when investigating the ability of other nonconsensual sources of rights to give rise to property rights.
